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LODGING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME: FROM
TRADE RHETORIC TO TRADE PLETHORIC*
Nasser Alreshaid* *
ABSTRACT
ile the international community is stimulated by the
new Sustainable Development Goals' impetus, the
V global trade regime lives through its 40's mid-life cri-
sis and anticipates what it does not know what to anticipate. Views
of the multilateral trading system being stalled by a proliferation
of other preferential trade agreements signal a deep inquiry into
this policy trend. This Article intends to highlight how these global
trade challenges could be mere air turbulence if lessons are drawn
from the new Sustainable Development Goals. By introducing the
very needs of states and their constituents through these Goals, an
inclusive and more representative international trade regime could
be achieved. This does though pose a challenge of how soft and
hard norms, or formal and informal rules, may have to interact
within a cooperative diversified manner.
1. INTRODUCTION
"The worry was that globalization might be
creating rich countries with poor people"1
Joseph Stiglitz
An ongoing worrisome debate persists as to the connection
trade has with the idea of development where the very aims of
international trade are questioned in terms of an applicable uni-
versal notion. Who is trade to prosper when consideration to the
capacity and goals of states within the international community
is at stake? Constituents of state governments have been central
to this debate today, anticipating a better future for them and
future generations.
Extensive literature may have continuously approached
the connection of trade liberalization and state regulation.
Developing countries started to doubt the international trade
regime and their bargaining power to shape their own internal
policies. Nevertheless, the added narrative here is how much this
debate has evolved today from the immense social and political
capital on the international level. This capital acknowledges a
shared aim that leaves some flexibility for states to tailor what
best fits each country's societies and further prospers the whole
human race as an outcome.
What we see today are the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) transforming into an ambitious sustainable develop-
ment agenda, with 17 attentive goals paving the road until
2030. A global consensus is highlighted as to the acceptance
these goals seemed to generate. This does not at all imply that
implementation of internal development policies within the con-
text of international trade isn't contentious in a globalized world.
What this study aims to do is track the development agenda
within the international trade regime to see how its evolution
signals the inevitable adoption of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) to make its future more realistic and predict-
able. The utmost importance of this attempt is to reveal to what
extent international legal norms are in harmony when different
international regimes link the same term to their agendas. When
referring to the international trade regime, it primarily includes
the multilateral trading system, but would still highlight regional
and bilateral trends in this regard. This is not to undermine the
complexities that would come with adopting such an idea, but
what could nevertheless be accomplished is a middle ground
where international trade constituents will have to give up some
of their privileges and powers for a greater and common good.
This Article will first briefly discuss how the term sustain-
able development came to being. When standing on what this
notion would refer to, the study will attempt to contrast this con-
cept with what the international trade regime holds as sustain-
able development, and how it may have evolved. To conclude,
solutions to reconcile the past with the future concerns as to how
to make the SDGs part of the multilateral trading system, and
perhaps inevitably regional and bilateral trade, will be addressed.
IL DEVELOPMENT QUALIFIED BY SUSTAINAEILITY
When lawyers engage in litigation, in many instances they
engage in challenging the meaning of legal terms within the con-
text of legal provisions, such as those based on the interpretation
principles in international law. These principles stem from the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), by ascertain-
ing the "ordinary meaning" of the term, in light of the "object
and purpose" of the treaty.'
The point here is that the interpretation of certain terms
may shape the future course of action of treaty provisions. Now,
this certainly applies to terms that may seem so ambiguous,
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perhaps even intentionally, that their ultimate application would
be questioned, unless some sense of flexibility is left to respect
differentiating treaty parties' intentions. One of such terms could
without a doubt be "sustainable development." This term in and
of itself has evolved in such a dynamic way that attributing an
actual meaning to it might not be attainable, such as is the case
with terms like "justice", "right", and "freedom."
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERM SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The term "development" can be approached from multiple
angles as to the inference that could be extracted from it. It could
be broadly viewed in terms of human freedoms it sets to prosper,
or even as a right to survival.3 On the other hand, a narrow view
of development refers to the rise of personal incomes as a result
of an increase in the gross national product (GNP), in addition
to technical and industrial advancements.4 While there could be
some added value to look into the origins and evolution of this
self-standing term, the aims
of this research go beyond
that. What is important how-
ever, is how the term has "'What we se
been qualified by the term
"sustainability".5  M ife nf um D(
The international com- (MIDG-s) t
munity has played a sig-
nificant role in ascertaining ous suscl
shared aims as to what the
term sustainable develop- agecnda, with I
ment may be perceived as. p he
The evolution of the term g er
could be broken down into
two stages, the period preced-
ing the transition into the MDGs, and the phase representing
today's SDGs. The two stages will be approached separately.
1. DEVELOPING THE WAY TO THE MDGs
In the early stages of fostering the term sustainable
development, the World Commission on Environment and
Development, or Brundtland Commission, published a report
called Our Common Future in 1987, which defined the term
as, "development that meets the needs of the present genera-
tion without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs." 6 Perhaps, adding an "altruistic" value to
development would ensure that present generations would act in
a way that ensures future generations would not be burdened by
past decisions that would interfere with the environment, health,
and economy and thus the capacity of the future generations to
continue this development.'
Who needs sustainable development? Developing coun-
tries? Developed? The idea is that people are the main subjects
of this agenda, as is the case with other human rights generally.'
If it makes it clearer, from a rights-based approach, no certain
category of people monopolizes this term. People living in devel-
oped countries are considered to fall under this term in their own
capacity in as much as constituents of developing countries. The
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idea is not who is most in need of utilizing this term, rather, the
aim of this term seems to highlight the global consensus that the
agenda's duty-bearers, predominantly states, are burdened with
such commitments that best serves the sustainable development
goals of the people of that certain society.9
As was highlighted in the earlier initiatives to qualify
development with sustainability, the efforts persisted in other
forums to link this term to their agendas. The UN Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992 reached a general consensus amongst 176 states on
the term sustainable development as being a major aim for the
international community.10 The European Union, and both the
UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions also
followed this route.11
During the Millennium Summit, held from Wednesday,
September 6, to Friday, September 8 in New York, and attended
by 149 heads of states and high-ranking officials from another 40







The result of the adopted
Declaration was a system-
atic move towards soft but
widespread international
consensus to elaborate on
these sustainable develop-
ment goals.13 It is some
sort of aspirational mission
creep if put in another way.
Some described these goals
as being "all-encompassing
concepts, if not a mantra."14
The MDG agenda included
eight goals to be achieved by
2015: 1) eradicate extreme
hunger and poverty, 2) achieve universal primary education, 3)
promote gender equality and empower women, 4) reduce child
mortality, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/Aids,
Malaria and other diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustain-
ability, and 8) global partnership for development, with eighteen
related specific targets, and forty-four quantifiable indicators. 15
And so the issue of possible implementation in light of this over
motivated attitude is worrisome on the domestic level, which
continues into the new stage.
2. TODAY'S SDGs
The journey of sustainable development creeping into new
venues continued after the MDGs, but this time the horizon was
pretty vast. On September 25, 2015, leaders from all over the
world met in New York and adopted U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 70/1 embracing 17 goals with 169 targets for the
period running until 2030.16 A sense of what sustainability meant
in terms of development to these states went as far as including
clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, descent
work and economic growth, industry innovation and infrastruc-
ture, sustainable cities and communities, responsible consump-
tion and production, life below water, life on land, and peace,
eC
justice, and strong institutions. 17 Mentioning the vast amount of
targets go beyond the scope of this Article and demand more
elaborate and in depth discussion. Nevertheless, what accompa-
nies this broad consensus is a high cost.18 It is estimated that
implementing such an agenda would be valued at $5-7 trillion.19
The SDGs are part of a global structure that questions the
very role local communities have in their implementation in a
way that best fits their conditions. What these SDGs sum up to,
as was the case with their predecessors, is that they are soft in
their establishment through Resolution 70/1 ("Resolution").20
Even in the language of the Resolution, with all the commit-
ments the state members took upon themselves, it is intended to
guide the participating governments in implementing a national
framework within the context of a generalized versus contextual-
ized development goals debate.21 Nevertheless, a broad and flex-
ible tone is evident throughout the Resolution and in the Goals
themselves, which implies that governments have some space to
implement their content.
It is only clear how
unclear the future of this
agenda is. But, what these
states have done through the It is estimated A
General Assembly is set the such an agenda w
bar high for other venues. If
there is something that stands at $5- 7 tr
out from all seventeen goals is
that almost any forum on the
international level could be a
stakeholder. For an international body to omit acknowledging this
new agenda would counter a new era of flexible general consensus.
I][1 WHAT'S TRADE GOT TO DO WITH IT?
The relationship international trade has with the previously
mentioned SDGs is mentioned in this chapter. International
trade in the context of this study refers mainly to the multilateral
trading system, i.e. the World Trade Organization (WTO),22 in
addition to other preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on the
regional, multi-regional, and bilateral level, in order to contrast
what these latter agreements may have done differently from the
WTO.
The recent proliferation of PTAs is certainly alerting, but
what remains is that this proliferation is not completely in dis-
content from the WTO provisions, including their plurilateral
agreements.2 What the WTO mainly did for these other agree-
ments is structure their main features.24 The issue that remains
essential for a collective progressive and successful international
trade regime is the extent to which these sustainable develop-
ment policies have a role.
What this chapter therefore sets to discuss is the current
structure of sustainable development within the WTO. After this,
a theoretical discussion on how the new SDGs could be linked
to the current WTO provisions would be attempted. When the
WTO correlation to the SDGs is reviewed, bilateral, regional,
and multi-regional PTAs will be highlighted as to their trend
towards the SDGs.
A. A "SUSTAINABLE" DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE IN THE
TRADE REGIME?
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade
and economic endeavour should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring
full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development. 2
5
The main aspects of sustainable development emerge
from the abovementioned 1994 WTO Marrakesh Agreement
Preamble's first paragraph.
This sets the primary objec-
tive of the multilateral
t implementing trading system. What is
'ould be valued important to point out is thatthis provision only came into
illion. being with the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the
WTO. What the multilateral
trading system represented
before was a different version of what global trade meant, a
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) version.26
GATT preceded the WTO as an agreement where parties
collaborated their efforts in order to facilitate the liberalization
of trade amongst them.27 What ended up being the main objec-
tive or free trade ideology of the parties relied on mainly two
dimensions, (1) market access on the one hand, which implied
eliminating trade barriers that included tariffs, quotas, and sub-
sidies; and (2) non-discrimination between the parties of GATT
was an aim that attracted global consensus. 28 These two features
have persisted in the WTO.2 9 What proceeded was the push by
developing countries to address more development needs, which
were raised during the four-year Kennedy Round from 1963-
1967, with minimal results.30 The structure of GATT remained,
but a GATT Committee on Trade and Development was estab-
lished. Institutionally, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) was also created in Geneva in
1964 to address the North-South divide.31
The negotiation of the Preamble of the previously mentioned
WTO Agreement may have likely been influenced by 1992's
UNCED, but this is not undisputable. 32 Another major reason
for this negotiated Preamble would be the rise of the regulatory
state and the proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTB), such as
environmental, labor related, consumer protection, and health
and safety.33 The objective of sustainable development seems to
be qualified by the optimal use of resources.3 4 However, there
is nothing that implies that it does not have broader inference
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when also connected to the ensuing sentence mentioning envi-
ronmental protections and preservations, and enhancements to
economic development conditions.
35
The problem with this objective is that what Robert Howse
refers to as "meta-structures" of the WTO, leave but minimal
space for state members to engage their sustainable development
policies in the midst of over-obligation. 36 These meta-structures
refer to the formal WTO rules and informal ones on different
topics, possessing normative value, which eventually guide the
negotiation table in terms of what is prioritized.3 7 This raises
many issues of inclusiveness and transparency when such meta-
structures are results of bargaining power.38 The Preamble's
language anticipates the role states retain to shape their inter-
nal policies within the meaning of economic growth, precisely
with the phrase "to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development. '39 The main debate remains as
to whether trade liberalization is an end in itself rather than a
means, and whether it is acceptable for a number of state mem-
bers to lag behind, as long as their contribution to the global
economy is minimal.4"
To be fair, progress towards recognizing the difficulties
certain countries face in implementing different trade obliga-
tions at the expense of what is perceived as local sustainable
development policies fought its way through to ultimate recogni-
tion, minimal though, as there is much to be done. Special and
Differential treatment (S&D) for instance, were reserved for
developing countries.
41
One point that has to be brought up in order to proceed
with this Article is the 2001 Doha Development Round (DDR)
Agenda. The intent is not to discuss its detailed failure, which
it seems to have generally incurred until this day; rather, the
intent to underscore sustainable development even more was
certainly present. 42 In the Doha Ministerial Declaration in
Paragraph 6, stated:
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objec-
tive of sustainable development, as stated in the
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are con-
vinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding
an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading
system, and acting for the protection of the environ-
ment and the promotion of sustainable development
can and must be mutually supportive. We take note
of the efforts by members to conduct national envi-
ronmental assessments of trade policies on a volun-
tary basis. We recognize that under WTO rules no
country should be prevented from taking measures
for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, or of the environment at the levels it consid-
ers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they
are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions pre-
vail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions
of the WTO Agreements. 43
There is clear emphasis in this Declaration that environmen-
tal preservation and protection, in addition to social develop-
ment, are just as important to the WTO as any perceived mere
economic aim.44 What global trade should aim to do in the lan-
guage of the Declaration is far more broad, and this implies that
developing countries realized first, the implications of their lack
of capacity, and second, that the dynamics of domestic input has
changed to demand more inclusiveness.
WTO Jurisprudence:
The WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case inter-
preted GATT 1994 Article XX in light of the WTO Preamble,
and in accordance with the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) and VCLT.45 GATT Article XX discusses what's called
"General Exceptions", acknowledging other policy objectives,
including the protection of human, animal, and plant life, the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and the protection
of public morals. 46 These reasons lead to circumventing the goals
of free trade that denote market access and non-discrimination.
In this case, the Appellate Body stressed the transformation
of the scope of Article XX.47 The basis for this was the evolution
of the Preamble of the WTO from GATT.48 The original objec-
tives of GATT were qualified by the new Preamble, in which
other provisions of the WTO are no longer confined to. 4 9 The
Appellate Body reports:
We note once more 144 that this language demon-
strates a recognition by WTO negotiators that opti-
mal use of the world's resources should be made in
accordance with the objective of sustainable devel-
opment. As this preambular language reflects the
intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement,
we believe it must add colour, texture and shading
to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to
the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.
We have already observed that Article XX(g) of the
GATT 1994 is appropriately read with the perspec-
tive embodied in the above preamble. 50
There should be consideration as well to the fact that the
Appellate Body did urge a more balanced approach between the
different provisions of the WTO Agreements and its Preamble.
However, such balancing could be perceived as referring to
procedural fairness, including transparency, rather than the sub-
stance of the issue. 51
A broad substantively unqualified term of sustainable devel-
opment could mean states would be able to interpret their mea-
sures in light of what they perceive the objective to encompass.
But then again, too much flexibility would also serve little to
assist other states with legitimate expectations.
B. THE ISSUE OF LINKAGE: READING THE NEW SDGs
INTO INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATED PROVISIONS
The dilemma of the implications of an outreaching SDG
agenda is of utmost importance, not only to international trade
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itself, but also to the whole international law framework we
live in today. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA) Under-Secretary General Mr. Wu Hongbo said, when
addressing U.N. General Assembly Second Committee earlier
this fall, "[t]his year could well be remembered as the year when
policy integration for sustainable development truly became a
common global vision.,"52 and, "[w]e have seen unprecedented
global cooperation to address some of the most challenging
issues of our time."5
3
A proliferation of different forums and venues on the inter-
national level may have been guided by establishing specialized
organizations to accompany the cooperative needs of states.
Easier said than done is what this proved in our current day. In
today's world, are issues really disintegrated when it comes to
acknowledging state regulatory policies?
As Joost Pauwelyn puts it in his book Conflicts of Norms
in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other
Rules of International Law, when referring to "nobler goals"
that trade should pursue, "[w]hen genuinely pursued, that is,
when not abused as a disguise restriction to trade, such goals
must trump the instrument of trade, even if they are not set out
in the WTO treaty itself"'54 and, "WTO law is not a secluded
island but part of that territorial domain of international law."55
His point being, the aim is achieving unity in international law,
not fragmentation. 56
This brings back the idea of "rights as trumps", in the sense
late Ronald Dworkin tried to emphasize, as an analogy for the
international sphere of relationships. 57 Or as international law
might know it, a sort of jus cogens for individual states that
overcome what utilitarian goal has been adopted by a number of
states, such as restricting trade barriers. 58
1. A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW LINKED FRAMEWORK"
HARD V. SOFT LA wDICHOTOMY No MoRE
The discussion at this point should not simply imply that
debates on whether the presence of an international legislature is
of central importance, albeit, its shaping the discourse of inter-
national law. There is much to talk about on that topic, and this
Article can bare no such extensive task. Nevertheless, the issue
of the normative value of international legal rules, if it was accu-
rate to say so, will begin from the end of this debate, and engage
instead in newly developed treatises on the international level.59
The International Law Commission, after setting up a study
group on the topic of "Fragmentation of International Law", has
opted for a more coherent approach when it comes to the differ-
ent norms on the international level. 60 It has adopted a strong
presumption against normative conflict in one of its reports.61
Within this debate on conflict of norms, inconsistencies of
obligations could subsist as another category of such conflict. 62
When different obligations by different sources occasionally col-
lide, or appear to at least, states seem to be left with a "cherry
picking" scenario. 63 When shared goals incite parties to differ-
ent multilateral treaties through "treaty-based sub-systems" to
inflict obligations on their parties, or even members, when the
end product is an organization, there exists norms that states
may favor differently within dissimilar situations.
64
Now, within the hierarchical context of international legal
norms, different stages can be approached to resolve conflicts
between norms.65 Perhaps a lex posterior attitude would first be
attempted as between supposedly conflicting treaty provisions. 66
However, when a "living treaty" exists, such as the WTO, this
method of conflict resolution could be of minimal effect.67
Hence, resorting to a lex specialis technique to disentangle con-
flicting debates would be more relevant, as is the case with envi-
ronmental issues being dealt with by Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs) as opposed to a purely trade-based treaty.68
In this regard, Gregory Schaffer & Mark Pollack discuss
conditions in which the relationship between soft and hard law is
of an "antagonistic" nature, and the interaction of hard and soft
law regimes:
[C]an lead to the hardening of soft law regimes,
resulting in more strategic bargaining and reducing
their purported advantages of consensus-building
through information-sharing and persuasion, and the
softening of hard law regimes, resulting in reduced
legal certainty and predictability. This result is more
likely where there is distributive conflict between
powerful states.6
9
This underscores the reality of how states themselves actually
employ a hard or soft law approach in the context of these two sets
interacting, instead of the norms being classified as such.70
2. A WTO INDUCED APPROACH TO LINKING THE SDGs
The Director-General of the WTO Roberto Azevedo com-
mented on the new SDGs by ensuring that trade has and always
will support development goals. 7' That recent jurisprudence of
the Organization's Dispute Settlement Body, on issues related
to the relationship between trade and renewable energy and
preservation and management of exhaustible natural resources
could help instigate trade rule amendments. 72 Moreover, the
fresh WTO Public Forum, commemorating 20 years of the
Organization's establishment, reiterated this discourse within
its program.7 3 This elicits a sort of lex lata version of what the
SDGs see international trade as.
In his speech during the United Nations summit to endorse
the "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", Azev6do
ensured, " I am pleased to join you today, and to pledge that
the WTO will play its full role in delivering the Sustainable
Development Goals."74 When elaborating, he explained how his
Organization has been playing a role in:
" Goal 2 looks at reforming agricultural markets to end
hunger-which is a key element of our agenda at the WTO.
" Goal 3 reaffirms the flexibilities offered by the WTO's rules
on intellectual property to protect public health.
" Goal 8 calls for the increased support for the poorest coun-
tries to participate in global trade, particularly through the
WTO's Aid for Trade initiative.
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" Goal 14 calls for action on fisheries subsidies to tackle
over-capacity and over-fishing, which again is an important
element of our work.
" And Goal 17 calls for the conclusion of negotiations on the
WTO's Doha Development Agenda.75
The last goal specifically, is of relevance to the issue of
linkage when it comes to the multilateral trading system in
particular. This system would have to push for a "universal
rule-based, open, non-discriminatory, and equitable system. '76
Goal 17 of the New SDGs aims to "strengthen the means of
implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sus-
tainable development. '77 This Goal is thus, an exploration of
what the WTO provisions set to achieve in relation to other
international legal norms.
Rather than an "integral type" agenda, the WTO provisions
are of a "reciprocal" nature when it comes to its member states.78
As such, its provisions meet the diversity needs of its members
within a larger international law framework.79 What should be
underlined, as Joost Pauwelyn stressed, is that the WTO is but a
component of what is known as international law.80
In the face of non-WTO
norms, it is the WTO Panel
and Appellate Body who are
left with a reconciliatory situ- 'They are a
ation. The WTO is obliged to
apply WTO provisions, refer- par and alig
ring to its constituted agree-
ments.81 What is nonetheless common goa
at stake here is that when flexibility in th
these non-WTO norms repre-
sent the "common interests" this can
of WTO members, it is these
WTO quasi judicial bodies
who have to live up to these
other conceding commitments when interpreting their very own
agreements.82 The VCLT supports this contention in the context
of the General Rules of Interpretation in Article 31/3, where,
"There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (c)
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties."83 The process may extend from an inter-
pretive one to an actual application of non-WTO rules.8 4 This
should not affect the members' relationships with third parties
though. What is crucial here is that the SDGs shouldn't be seen
as contradicting trade-related provisions within the WTO, in this
context. They are actually both on par and aligned to work for a
common goal, allowing some flexibility in the means in which
this can be achieved.
What is as important in order to implement, or perhaps
empower, the content of the SDGs within the multilateral trad-
ing system, is the notion of "good governance". 85 It is only fair
that the emphasis be not only on the outcome consensus where
sustainable development is "sustained" in the policies and prac-
tices of international forums, like the WTO.86 States themselves
have to contribute to this balancing effort in trying to shape





development goals of utmost importance locally, but still mini-
mally affects liberalized trade relationships with other trading
counterparts with the multilateral trading system. A significantly
complex balance is expected from states, which is by far no easy
task, and should ensure that states do not ultimately externalize
their internal policies.
87
There remains much to be done on the multilateral level
when it comes to implementing the SDGs within the existing
legal framework. The legal structure of certain departments in
this organization must allow for the presence of other stakehold-
ers, who oversee the very implementation of the SDGs.8 These
counterparts would include UNDP, UNCTAD, and UNHCHR, in
addition to other NGOs too.89 This reform to WTO Committees
allows first of all, for a transparent process, and secondly, for
a sort of inevitable interdisciplinary assistance in drawing on
international legal norms that mirror the concerns of states
exemplified by the SDGs.9
0
The WTO has been facing problems as to concluding
negotiations related to key trade issues, one of which is agricul-
ture. 91 When the current multilateral trading system represents
161 member states, in which
about 98% of the global
market is covered, negotia-
allyboth on tions without a doubt become
more complex.92 Not only is
to workfor a the South widely represented
in this Organization, but also1/owing some the North faces competing
ieans in which perspectives.93 The BRICsis fully represented in this
chievedo" system, and so key global
market stakeholders are
included, such as China and
Russia.94 The final bargaining
word may not be exclusive to the West after all when it comes to
today's international trade policies.
C. REGIONALISM AND BILATERALISM WHEN
MULTILATERALISM FAILS: REDEFINING TRADE
BARGAINING POWER ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Today's phenomenon of a proliferation of PTAs is under
high scrutiny.95 In its World Investment Report 2015, UNCTAD
discusses the global foreign direct investment dimension, which
necessarily shares many of the characteristics of today's interna-
tional trade regime, especially where agreements regulate both
trade and investment. 96 This Report highlights the stable con-
clusion of international investment agreements (IIAs), whereas
the number bilateral investment agreements (BITs) declined
than the previous year.97 There is an additional 31 IIAs, which
raises the number of total IIAs to 3,271, in which 2,926 are BITs
and 345 are other IIAs, by the end of 2014.98 And while BITs
decline, more regional and sub-regional negotiations take place,
including the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Tripartite, and
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Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus
negotiations involving 90 countries.
99
The report noted that main incentives for countries to
review their model investment and trade policies are SDG
related objectives.100 Twelve countries in Africa, ten in Europe
and North America, eight in Latin America, seven in Asia, six
economies in transition, and four regional organizations engaged
in this trend. 10 1 At least one provision of these newly reviewed
agreements include ensuring the right of states to regulate for
public interest purposes, mainly, to meet sustainable develop-
ment targets, which included health and safety policies, and
environmental standards.10 2 Perhaps, displaying some of these
recent trends would clarify the situation more.
1. TRENDS AND FIGURES
Revealing some of the contents of the most recent dif-
ferent model agreements, and concluded agreements them-
selves, would supplement the results the previous 2015 World
Investment Report reached. The trend towards bilateralism,
regionalism, and multi-regionalism is not unique to a certain
region.10 3 Interestingly, it is not really even a continuum of the
North-South divide, or a developed vis-i-vis developing coun-
try tension. 104 Both developed and developing countries have
adopted SDG oriented agreements.
10 5
High-income Organization of Economic Cooperative and
Development (OECD) member Norway is one example of this
shift of policies to meet the needs of sustainable development.
10 6
Its 2015 Model BIT is evidence of the state's intentions to meet
the sustainable development needs of its citizens.
This Model BIT initiated its text by emphasizing the aim
of investments geared to serve sustainable development needs
in their economic, social, and environmental dimensions. 10 7
This included "high levels" of environmental, health, safety,
and labor protections. 10 8 The Preamble reiterated the impor-
tance of sustainable development objectives that fit national
and global standards. 109
The Norwegian Model BIT went further to include sustain-
able development safeguards within the contents of its provi-
sions. Article 11/1, under "Not Lowering Standards", mentioned:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health,
human rights, safety or environmental measures
or labour standards. Accordingly, a Party should
not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures
as an encouragement for the establishment, acqui-
sition, expansion or retention of an investment of
an investor. 110
What followed in Article 12, entitled "Right to Regulate" was:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
this Agreement that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to health, safety, human rights,
labour rights, resource management or environmen-
tal concerns. 111
This is one of the most recent model BITs that provides
strong support for sustainable development objectives. 112
High income Norway sets a clear example on how the SDGs
are shared interests amongst the different countries across the
globe. The language of the Norwegian Model BIT provisions are
pretty firm on trade and investment serving sustainable devel-
opment, which gives states flexibility to implement policies in
this regard. The Preamble itself, after mentioning the objective
of investments being sustainable development, and including
examples of such, pressed for local policies to be congeal to this
aim by the phrase "in accordance with relevant internationally
recognized standards and agreements in these fields to which
they are parties." '113 This concluding sentence adds much lever-
age to the new SDGs, where they can guide local policies and
ensure they fall within the scope of a global consensus with the
adoption of the SDGs.
The 2012 U.S. Model BIT in comparison omitted mention-
ing the term "sustainable development" from its Preamble.11
4
It instead included the substance of this term, referring to the
aim to "maximize effective utilization of economic resources
and improve living standards," and drawing on investor-state
dispute related requisites of the term "investment."115 Where, as
in the Salini test, the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Tribunal concluded that an invest-
ment infers, "contributions, a certain duration of performance
of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction.
The Conventions Preamble of the ICSID Convention may add
the contribution to the economic development of the host state
of the investment as an additional condition." 116 In this case, the
Tribunal, considered infrastructure construction in Morocco,
and the technical expertise, referred to as "know-how," which
the Italian company offered to the host state Morocco, as con-
stitutive of the economic development element of the invest-
ment.117 The U.S. Model BIT is not really an outlier because it
appears to have engaged in identifying sustainable development
components reserved for state regulation without mentioning the
magic word, "sustainable development."11 8
On a regional note, and in the context of the African nation,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Model
BIT template of 2012 represents a "southern" shared perspec-
tive on implementing sustainable development. The Preamble
set the intentions of the parties' investments to fulfill sustainable
development objectives in a similar manner as the Norwegian
Model BIT.119 The extensive template, however, leaves the term
sustainable development undefined, following the trend of other
comparative approaches.120
The SADC Model BIT includes environmental and social
impact assessments provisions, and it sets the threshold to
the highest standard, be it the national standard or that of
the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. 121
The international standards are invoked once more to ensure that
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some sort of technically screened efforts monitor local policies,
although it may not be confined to this particular IFC source.
122
This Model BIT particularly highlights the precautionary prin-
ciple as being a pre-requisite for any investment. 123
After stressing the right of host states to regulate in the
name of sustainable development objectives in Article 20 of
the SADC Model BIT, it went further to stress the possibility
of addressing past racial injustices in the African region within
new investments. 124 The South African Investment Treaty lan-
guage influenced the wording of this article as the Commentary
put it.125 This would be aligned with SDG goal 10, "reducing
inequality within and among countries." Further, perhaps the
newly introduced goal 16 would embody this as well by "promot-
ing peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable,
and inclusive institutions at all levels."'126 The interdisciplinary
sensation in Article 21/3 and SDG's produce, an inclusive only
process, results in sustainable development intersecting with
transitional justice goals where trade, sustainable development
and transitional justice serve certain communities, such as post-
conflict South Africa. 12
7
The extensive Eurasian Economic Union-Vietnam PTA
offers a whole Chapter entitled "Sustainable Development."' 128
It defined the term's components as, "The Parties recognize that
economic development, social development and environmental
protection are interdependent and mutually supportive com-
ponents of sustainable development." 129 This Agreement gave
consideration, as it did in its Preamble, to the different levels
of development of its parties, and it considered policies in this
direction as part of the sovereignty of states, with the obligation
on its parties not to abuse their policies in order to discretely
adopt protectionist measures.1 3 ' The Agreement consequently
illustrated a framework for cooperation amongst its parties to
achieve sustainable development objectives. 131
The mega-regional agreement mentions the term sustain-
able development in the context of environmental protection. 
132
This seems to imply that sustainable development has been ulti-
mately confined to environmental development, but the ensuing
provisions below counter this intuition with economic and even
cultural development avenues. This certainly signals though
the strength of environmental concerns within this agreement.
The Agreement's Preamble provides the aim to, "promote high
levels of environmental protection, including through effective
enforcement of environmental laws, and further the aims of
sustainable development, including through mutually supportive
trade and environmental policies and practices."1 33
A rather distinct cultural blend or preservation was also
included in the text of the TPP 134 An insinuation of a rather
sustainable perspective on the maintenance of local ownership
over trade rules seem to be protected through their participation,
where Article 29.8 mentions, "Subject to each Party's interna-
tional obligations, each Party may establish appropriate mea-
sures to respect, preserve and promote traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions."' 135
Furthermore, Chapter 23 of the TPP is devoted fully to the
idea of "development." 136 It elaborates development on many
of its aspects, and is used sometimes interchangeably with the
term "economic growth." 137 The Agreement, nevertheless,
emphasizes the joint role in achieving development objectives
in Article 23.6, including working with bilateral partners, private
companies, academic institutions, and non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs). 138
Chapter 20 stands out when it comes to environmental
concerns under the rhetoric of sustainable development. 139 This
Chapter offered extensive support to environmental concerns,
linking many other agreements, i.e. Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs), and empowering other actors, such as
private partners.140 The Chapter emphasizes through Article
20.2 that environmental protections are of a cooperative nature,
thus, local environmental laws or measures shouldn't be used
to disguise protectionism or restriction on trade and investments
between the parties. Policy or standard "coherence" in another
sense is what the Agreement appears to be pushing for, although
this delicate balance could prove more complex in practice. 14 1
This is especially true when considering that ensuing Article
20.3, "General Commitments," stresses the importance of state
owned and initiated environmental policies as recognition of
state's sovereignty. 142
What captivates this idea of a qualified type of regula-
tory practice in the TPP is the whole chapter on "Regulatory
Coherence." 143 The idea within this Chapter evolves around a
harmonized status quo, in which "sovereign" states would draw
on good practices in "planning, designing, issuing, implement-
ing, and reviewing" their domestic regulatory policies to achieve
their objectives, while still maintaining a cooperative cross-
border relationship to further the main objectives of the TPP.144
The same Chapter steers states to the means for reaching such
coherence, and further establishes the Committee for Regulatory
Coherence to oversee parties' regulatory activity, and more
broadly, global best practices. 145
The idea of a coherent structure that the TPP seems to have
struck may just be a restatement that harmonized complementar-
ity between trade agreements remains desirable. The bilateral,
regional, and multi-regional trade phenomenon is not completely
disintegrated from WTO provisions. State members' rights and
obligations under WTO provisions are referred to when establish-
ing the foundations of other recent PTAs. 146 The TPP, for instance,
ensured that it draws on the WTO members' rights and obligations
in the Preamble itself 147 And in Article 1.2 of the TPP Agreement,
entitled "Relation to other Agreements," the TPP reiterates the
connection of its parties to their WTO commitments.
148
D. ARE WE GOING TOO FAR?
With seventeen goals and one hundred sixty-nine targets,
are the new SDGs too much for global trade to bear? Perhaps
not, when taking into consideration that the global trade regime
is not expected to act solely upon the SDGs. The proposal of
inter-agency collaboration is only logical when it comes to this
gigantic undertaking in the name of the new SDGs. 149 The idea
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of a collaborative effort would anticipate the role of all key
actors, whether private actors in the form of multinational enter-
prises (MNEs), small and medium enterprises (SMEs), civil
society, or governments themselves. Private standard setting
may be just as important as governmental or inter-governmental
standard setting, as is the case with global value chains (GVCs).
This may encompass a debate between a rule-based global trade
regime as opposed to a power-based one. 150 It is quintessential to
comprehend informal means of standard setting to complement
hard provisions. 151 It is the plot where states take a firm position
with hard treaty provisions when the compliance of other treaty
parties is crucial. Whereas, when states are faced with a scenario
that requires more flexibility to take certain actions, it would opt
for softer provisions "without institutional teeth." 152 The very
idea of a vast array of goals and targets within the SDGs makes
this perhaps necessary.
Late John Jackson discussed the importance of institu-
tional structures to regulate global norms,15 3 where he refers
to this institutional feature as the "constitution" of the world
trading system. 154 He emphasized this structure, in an anal-
ogy to domestic constitutions; goes further to even include
informal mechanisms and "practices". 15 5 He followed up with
this idea in the aftermath of the Seattle riots, challenging the
institutional structure of the WTO, and further stresses thus
far a "rule-oriented system" approach. 156 Jackson accentuates
the importance of an international organization, while not able
to directly implement technical or non-technical measures for
the market economy itself, establishes rules that are necessar-
ily "effective, reasonably efficient to implement, and credible
enough" to allow domestic policies to build upon them in
different business state of affairs.157 And although this seems
reasonable and credible in and of itself, the problem today is
that states debate the flexibility they have in implementing
technically complex rules, which is why this has partially been
acknowledged through (S&D) provisions. 158
One major explanation for considering informal means of
standard setting is the fact that when it comes to multilateral and
mega-regional trade agreements, reaching an agreement amongst
a vast array of members or parties is extremely thorny.159 In
terms of incorporating the SDGs into international trade, since
they are so dynamic when tracing their history and passing
through the MDGs, a dynamic and flexible means of living up to
an this accelerating agenda, would better fit this condition, and
this is where informal standard setting can play a role. 160
As for the issue of compliance with this informal standard-
setting approach, there are many elements that incite, or even
force states to comply. 161 Reputation cost, reciprocity, and
obtaining certain international benefits, by first meeting a certain
threshold, such as the case of the International Monetary Fund
and its Articles of Agreement, and the World Bank and its devel-
opment aid dimensions, can play a crucial role. 162
To clarify this informal international standard approach in
international trade, there is evidence from the Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Agreement. 163 This Agreement aims to ensure
that technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment
procedures, are non-discriminatory and do not restrict trade,
but on the other hand allow for some policy objectives to be
achieved, such as the protection of human health and safety or
the environment, where state member measures are based on
"international standards." 164 What has been established within
the WTO as a result is the TBT Committee, which functions
in mainly two areas, reviewing member specific measures, and
strengthening the implementation of the TBT Agreement. 165 The
TBT Committee highlighted six major principles in its 2000
Decision that should guide WTO members in adopting interna-
tional standards that lead state regulations and measures. 166 The
Principles are (1) transparency, (2) openness, (3) impartiality and
consensus, (4) effectiveness and relevance, (5) coherence, and
(6) addressing the concerns of developing countries. 167 These
six principles swim in the sea of transparency and participation
amongst WTO TBT Agreement parties. 168 It stressed the impor-
tance that local governments, non-governmental standardizing
bodies, and regional standardizing bodies, of which they are
members, also accept these standards, as in the Code of Good
Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Implementation of
Standards ("the Code"), Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. 169
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body acknowledges this
friendly shift towards soft international standard setting. The
2012 Appellate Body Report in the US-Tuna II case undertook
the task of examining the international standards that were
adopted by Mexico in order to justify its measure. 170 But the
Appellate Body denied international standard status to the
adopted measure. The reason was because the process through
the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conversation
Program did not fulfill the "soft" TBT Committee Principles
of transparency and participation precisely, although they also
overlapped with the other principles, where open contribution
for other WTO members is respected. 17 1
As for follow-up mechanisms to sustainable development
objectives in international trade, taking into consideration
the "aspirational" nature of the SDGs for states, the review
mechanisms would perhaps fit a "gentle", but effective approach
towards trade policies.172 In Alice Tipping and Robert Wolf's
Working Draft on Trade and Sustainable Development: Options
for Follow-up and Review of the Trade-related Elements of the
Post-2015 Agenda and Financing for Development, they pro-
pose this review mechanism, and trace the components of this
mechanism to the different international forums, including the
WTO, UNCTAD, the World Bank, and other regional organiza-
tions such as OECD, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), SADC,
and both United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) and United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 173
The previous Working Paper identified categories, or "clus-
ters," of SDG topics of which international trade intersects. 174
The six categories underlined comprised of the issue of reforms
of subsidies to agriculture, fisheries, fossil fuels, and enhancing
market access for small enterprises in this regard.175 Another
category was international cooperation related to technology for
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water and sanitation, clean energy, infrastructure, and access to
medicines. 176 A third cluster was the role of economic diversifi-
cation, trade facilitation, and empowering global value chains. 177
The following category was related to illegal extraction and
trade in natural resources and chemicals. 178 The fifth category
was connected to DDR structural aims of empowering develop-
ing countries; including least developed countries LDCs' market
access. 179 Lastly, the sixth group referred to policy coherence at
the different levels, a framework that would embrace multilat-
eral, regional, and local trade rules. 180
It is also worth raising in this regard that concerted efforts
have already began taking place to implement such review
mechanisms in the face of
the complex SDGs task in its
association to trade. 181 The
United Nations Secretary- "Lodging
General has established
the United Nations System international tn
Task Team on the Post-2015 but it is neverth
United Nations Development
Agenda (Task Team), not only
to prepare for this agenda,




is co-chaired by the UN Department on Economic and Social
Affairs, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and
further accumulates more than 60 different UN agencies and
international organizations, of which UNCTAD is one. 183
IV CONCLUSION
Lodging the SDGs into international trade is no easy task,
but it is nevertheless unavoidable. The SDGs may be teaching us
a lesson about how elaborate the issue of "linkage" has evolved
to be, and the importance of concerted cooperative solutions
in this manner.18 4 Even when shifting to international trade,
purely national regulatory measures don't seem to easily fit into
this logic of shared values, which might explain alternations
towards regionalism in an interdependent economic world. 185
Nonetheless, states do have their own worries and interests in
which the SDGs took into account when setting an elaborate
framework, coated with several technical guidelines. 186
This Article has attempted to illustrate how the sustain-
able development agenda has evolved into what it has become
today. This agenda has encompassed a vast array of topics that
the international community agreed represents their respective
diverse needs today. In parallel to this agenda, or perhaps from
within, exists an international
trade regime struggling to
prove that domestic develop-
S) (is into ment needs are apprehended
is y ask, within a global framework,
and as a result, a substantial
s unavoidable." number of PTAs emerge in
response to a multilateral
trading system. What has
been addressed in these dif-
ferent PTAs, whether of a bilateral, regional, or multiregional
nature, are that sustainable development needs must be embarked
upon by any international trade agenda.
The burdensome task of taking into account the new SDGs
within the international trade regime requires taking "linkages"
a step further. Linking the new SDGs agenda would mean a
comprehensive, interrelated, interagency consideration, where
soft and hard law, formal and informal rules, would shape a
common end and redefine contemporary boundaries. The pro-
cess is certainly costly, technically challenging, and politically
multifaceted, but possible.
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